Presentation to the Blue Helmet Forum Austria
4-6 June 2009
National Sovereignty, Domestic Jurisdiction and Consent:
The Last Refuges of Scoundrels[1]
By James V. Arbuckle, O.M.M., C.D.
Shall I say what I mean?
Mean what I say?
- Marianne Faithful
Introduction
This paper is NOT JUST about peace operations in Chad; rather it is about ALL peace operations throughout the history of peacekeeping:
The issue of consent to an operation is central to the mandating and the conduct of all interventions. The post-Cold War surge in intra-national conflicts has increased the importance of this issue, as interventions almost inevitably encounter issues of national sovereignty. In Sudan, especially in the West Darfur region of Sudan, we see today most clearly the ongoing struggle between, on the one hand, national sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction and “host” consent and, on the other hand, a clear case of a need – some would say a responsibility – for outsiders to intervene.
Sunday, January 24, 2010
Friday, January 22, 2010
Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process
Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process
Buy or Download
Issue Areas
Conflict Management and Resolution
Mediation and Facilitation
Post-Conflict Activities
Centers
Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution
February 2009 Book by Ingrid A. Lehmann
Those who mediate international conflicts must communicate publicly with a wide variety of audiences, from governments and rebel forces to local and international media, NGOs and IGOs, divided communities and diasporas.
Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process helps mediators identify and develop the resources and strategies they need to reach these audiences. It highlights essential information tasks and functions, discusses key challenges and opportunities, and provides expert guidance on effective approaches. Examples from past mediations illustrate how various strategies have played out in practice.
The handbook sets out six steps that can be undertaken by mediators and their information teams before, during, and after peace negotiations:
• Analyze the Information Environment
• Plan Early for Information Needs
• Design a Public Information Strategy
• Implement a Communication Program
• Engage Civil Society•
Monitor, Evaluate, Assess
Following Managing a Mediation Process, this volume is the second handbook in the Peacemaker’s Toolkit series. Each handbook addresses a particular facet of the work of mediating violent conflicts, including such topics as negotiating with terrorists, constitution making, assessing and enhancing ripeness, and Track-II peacemaking.
Buy or Download
Issue Areas
Conflict Management and Resolution
Mediation and Facilitation
Post-Conflict Activities
Centers
Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution
February 2009 Book by Ingrid A. Lehmann
Those who mediate international conflicts must communicate publicly with a wide variety of audiences, from governments and rebel forces to local and international media, NGOs and IGOs, divided communities and diasporas.
Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process helps mediators identify and develop the resources and strategies they need to reach these audiences. It highlights essential information tasks and functions, discusses key challenges and opportunities, and provides expert guidance on effective approaches. Examples from past mediations illustrate how various strategies have played out in practice.
The handbook sets out six steps that can be undertaken by mediators and their information teams before, during, and after peace negotiations:
• Analyze the Information Environment
• Plan Early for Information Needs
• Design a Public Information Strategy
• Implement a Communication Program
• Engage Civil Society•
Monitor, Evaluate, Assess
Following Managing a Mediation Process, this volume is the second handbook in the Peacemaker’s Toolkit series. Each handbook addresses a particular facet of the work of mediating violent conflicts, including such topics as negotiating with terrorists, constitution making, assessing and enhancing ripeness, and Track-II peacemaking.
R2P vs State Sovereignty: The Last Refuge of Scoundrels
Presentation to Canadian Studies Centre Symposium
The University of Innsbruck
12 November 2009
R2P vs State Sovereignty: The Last Refuge of Scoundrels
- by James V. Arbuckle
Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.[1]
- Dr. Samuel Johnson, 1775
Introduction
The responsibility for the conduct of states towards their people has long been a subject of controversy. None of any outsider’s business, said Hitler in 1933 (to the League of Nations), and Stalin in 1948 (to the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the General Assembly (GA) of the United Nations on 10 December 1948, and changed forever the concept of the relationship of a state to its people, and its responsibility for them.
Despite the apparent ease of the Assembly vote on rhe UDHR (there had been abstentions, but no votes against), the subsequent approval, ratification and implementation by the member states was by no means a forgone conclusion (nor is it yet). The Soviet Union objected to what it saw as setting a precedent for outsider interference in its domestic jurisdiction. They and eight other members abstained from the General Assembly vote, and the USSR was never a signatory to the Declaration. A good many member states tacitly agreed – and do still - with the Soviet view that the UDHR was a potential threat to their sovereignty (thus coincidentally agreeing also with Hitler and Stalin); among them were the United States and China, indeed, all of the P5 agreed on that one thing, if on nothing else: their own sovereignty, and for Britain that included her empire, was their primary concern.
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was born of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which entailes a “comprehensive view of security”, giving human rights equal weight with the more traditional military and political factors of peace and security. Thus human rights, a long-standing taboo in East-West relations, became by virtue of the Final Act a legitimate subject of dialogue[2]; the peace agenda might never be the same.
In any event the appearance of a policy and associated doctrine had been established, and history unfolded into the Twenty-first Century with that altered background.
Discussion
It was in this apparently altered climate that the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released its report in December 2001 (see Annex A for summary). Now generally referred to as The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the document ostensibly became U.N. policy when it was embraced by the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, and by nearly all member states of the U.N., in September 2005. That “policy” as it was written is largely based on military action in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter[4]. However, it is today very clear that the Security Council will seldom authorize a forced intervention in a member state – the issues of consent of the “hosts” and respect for their “domestic jurisdiction” are as strong as ever.
Thinking of Haiti in the Night I am Robbed of Sleep
THINKING ABOUT HAITI IN THE NIGHT I AM ROBBED OF SLEEP[1]
By James V. Arbuckle, O.M.M., C.D.
Introduction
The Haiti earthquake is not quite the greatest catastrophe, natural or manmade, which has occurred since World War II: the death tolls in Bangladesh in 1970, China in 1976 and 2004 and on the Indian Ocean in 2004, probably exceeded the presumed deaths in Haiti this week[2]. Much has or should have been learned form these earlier tragedies about disaster relief and about reconstruction, and these early days of inevitably and excusably frantic and uncoordinated efforts must now be giving way to more effective and sustainable programmes. Detailled planning for the next stages must begin now.
We have learned in the course of that calamitous 20th Century to think of disaster response as having three phases:
Rescue;
Relief; and
Reconstruction.
The distinctions among these phases may be less apparent than conceptual; certain it is that each is heavily influenced by the others and that they must be planned with this interdependence in mind. Indeed, it will be useful if planning for all three phases begins immediately and concurrently.
Before we proceed to examine each of these clusters of issues, we need to pause to take cognizance of four Leitmotifs which will run throughout this article; these are:
Security. This is no longer a chicken-or-egg question – restoring and maintaining a positive security environment, without which all efforts may be frustrated, and will at least be severely hindered, will be a vital function of the intervention.
Interagency Cooperation. This is neither the time nor the place for the various agencies who will respond to the emergency to compete with or attempt to ignore each other. Still less may they take the time and the effort to jockey for position or a share of the limelight. This is an extremely complex situation, and it can only be approached in a spirit of collegial cooperation and effective coordination of resources and capabilities. The grim reaper has no sympathy for omissions or for duplications. And the people care very little who helps them.
Indigenous Capabilities. These can neither be ignored nor romanticized. Haiti has not had in the best of times a very effective government, nor for that matter much else in the way of functioning institutions. This is not to deny the courage and the intelligence of many Haitians, and individuals will have much to contribute. Collectively, however, Haitian society is a very different story. The most should be made of local institutions, but they must be viewed realistically.
Public Information. Much harm can be done in the very early stages of the intervention by poor passage of information, especially to the local population, and this is exacerbated by the collapse of the infrastructure. Nevertheless, disinformation, rumour and unrealistic expectations are the vermin which emerge spontaneously at the scene of a disaster and, like vermin, these must be brought under control from the very outset. The overall coordination of the information programme must be done by the highest level of authority in the country.
By James V. Arbuckle, O.M.M., C.D.
Introduction
The Haiti earthquake is not quite the greatest catastrophe, natural or manmade, which has occurred since World War II: the death tolls in Bangladesh in 1970, China in 1976 and 2004 and on the Indian Ocean in 2004, probably exceeded the presumed deaths in Haiti this week[2]. Much has or should have been learned form these earlier tragedies about disaster relief and about reconstruction, and these early days of inevitably and excusably frantic and uncoordinated efforts must now be giving way to more effective and sustainable programmes. Detailled planning for the next stages must begin now.
We have learned in the course of that calamitous 20th Century to think of disaster response as having three phases:
Rescue;
Relief; and
Reconstruction.
The distinctions among these phases may be less apparent than conceptual; certain it is that each is heavily influenced by the others and that they must be planned with this interdependence in mind. Indeed, it will be useful if planning for all three phases begins immediately and concurrently.
Before we proceed to examine each of these clusters of issues, we need to pause to take cognizance of four Leitmotifs which will run throughout this article; these are:
Security. This is no longer a chicken-or-egg question – restoring and maintaining a positive security environment, without which all efforts may be frustrated, and will at least be severely hindered, will be a vital function of the intervention.
Interagency Cooperation. This is neither the time nor the place for the various agencies who will respond to the emergency to compete with or attempt to ignore each other. Still less may they take the time and the effort to jockey for position or a share of the limelight. This is an extremely complex situation, and it can only be approached in a spirit of collegial cooperation and effective coordination of resources and capabilities. The grim reaper has no sympathy for omissions or for duplications. And the people care very little who helps them.
Indigenous Capabilities. These can neither be ignored nor romanticized. Haiti has not had in the best of times a very effective government, nor for that matter much else in the way of functioning institutions. This is not to deny the courage and the intelligence of many Haitians, and individuals will have much to contribute. Collectively, however, Haitian society is a very different story. The most should be made of local institutions, but they must be viewed realistically.
Public Information. Much harm can be done in the very early stages of the intervention by poor passage of information, especially to the local population, and this is exacerbated by the collapse of the infrastructure. Nevertheless, disinformation, rumour and unrealistic expectations are the vermin which emerge spontaneously at the scene of a disaster and, like vermin, these must be brought under control from the very outset. The overall coordination of the information programme must be done by the highest level of authority in the country.
Introduction to Peacehawks
Peacehawks is a mom-and-pop academic ngo, founded by Ingrid Lehmann, Ph. D. and Jamie Arbuckle, O.M.M., C.D. Peacehawks is based on the principle that international peace can and must be enforced, just as are national and local laws. The international community has the firm obligation to protect the rights of peoples as defined by customary international law, taking "all necessary measures" to ensure the safety and security of nations and peoples, and "to maintain international peace and security."
It is clear that, in the long term, interventions will require the consent of the "hosts", however "all necessary measures" must be taken to include the creation of a climate of consent, whether by carrot or stick; consent may and sometimes must be induced. There is thus a requirement for muscular peacekeeping, and many occasions when nothing less will do. When peace descends, it is to be treated with respect, hence our logo (for which many thanks to Jason), which shows a hawk with an olive branch, and our motto:
About Ingrid
About Jamie
Jamie Arbuckle is a Canadian but, like a lot of Canadians, he wasn’t born there. He was born in Dayton, Ohio, the result of an earlier Dayton Agreement. At 18 he immigrated to Canada and joined the Black Watch, as a private. Three years later, having become a Canadian citizen, he was commissioned a 2Lt in The Royal Canadian Regiment. He retired from the Canadian Army in 1995. In his 36 years in the Army, he served in airborne, mechanized and light infantry units. He served 12 years with Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany, including two postings with the Bundeswehr. As a peacekeeper, he served three tours with the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and with UNPROFOR in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia in 1992.
Jamie was a member of the Faculty of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Nova Scotia from 1995 – 1999. From 1999 to 2003, he was a member of the Capacity Building and Training Section of the OSCE in Vienna. He was in that period principally responsible for assisting in the design and delivery of the New Member Induction Programme for the OSCE. He also delivered seminars on Conflict Management for the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna and for missions in Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Albania, as well as at the Austrian Peace Support Command, the German Foreign Ministry Training Centre in Bonn and at York University in the UK.
Jamie has written several articles on military issues for professional publications, and a book entitled The Level Killing Fields of Yugoslavia: An Observer Returns, published by the Pearson Press in 1999. He was the English copy editor for the Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations, published by Kluwer Law International in 2002. His book on the military role in humanitarian operations, entitled Military Forces in Twenty-first Century Peace Operations: No Job for a Soldier?, was published by Routledge /Taylor and Francis in 2006.
Jamie lives in the Salzkammergut in Austria.
It is clear that, in the long term, interventions will require the consent of the "hosts", however "all necessary measures" must be taken to include the creation of a climate of consent, whether by carrot or stick; consent may and sometimes must be induced. There is thus a requirement for muscular peacekeeping, and many occasions when nothing less will do. When peace descends, it is to be treated with respect, hence our logo (for which many thanks to Jason), which shows a hawk with an olive branch, and our motto:
Whatever it Takes!
About Ingrid
Ingrid A. Lehmann is the author of Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire (London: Cass, 1999) and many articles on issues of international political communication. She is a practitioner who worked in the United Nations Secretariat for over twenty-five years, including service in the Department of Public Information and in two UN peacekeeping missions. Ingrid has an MA in history from the University of Minnesota and an MA and a doctorate in political science from the University of Berlin. In 1993–94 she was a fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University; in 1996–97 she was a researcher at Yale University’s UN Studies Program; and in 2004 she was a fellow at Harvard University’s Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy. Ingrid now lives near Salzburg, Austria, where she has been teaching in the Department of Communication Science of the University of Salzburg.
About Jamie
Jamie Arbuckle is a Canadian but, like a lot of Canadians, he wasn’t born there. He was born in Dayton, Ohio, the result of an earlier Dayton Agreement. At 18 he immigrated to Canada and joined the Black Watch, as a private. Three years later, having become a Canadian citizen, he was commissioned a 2Lt in The Royal Canadian Regiment. He retired from the Canadian Army in 1995. In his 36 years in the Army, he served in airborne, mechanized and light infantry units. He served 12 years with Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany, including two postings with the Bundeswehr. As a peacekeeper, he served three tours with the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and with UNPROFOR in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia in 1992.
Jamie was a member of the Faculty of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Nova Scotia from 1995 – 1999. From 1999 to 2003, he was a member of the Capacity Building and Training Section of the OSCE in Vienna. He was in that period principally responsible for assisting in the design and delivery of the New Member Induction Programme for the OSCE. He also delivered seminars on Conflict Management for the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna and for missions in Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Albania, as well as at the Austrian Peace Support Command, the German Foreign Ministry Training Centre in Bonn and at York University in the UK.
Jamie has written several articles on military issues for professional publications, and a book entitled The Level Killing Fields of Yugoslavia: An Observer Returns, published by the Pearson Press in 1999. He was the English copy editor for the Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations, published by Kluwer Law International in 2002. His book on the military role in humanitarian operations, entitled Military Forces in Twenty-first Century Peace Operations: No Job for a Soldier?, was published by Routledge /Taylor and Francis in 2006.
Jamie lives in the Salzkammergut in Austria.
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