The Mediator’s Handbook for Durable Peace, by Evan A. Hoffmann, the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiations, Ottawa, 2010.
Reviewed for Peacehawks by Jamie Arbuckle
At only 52 pages, this slim volume will scarcely displace the baton from anyone’s rucksack, but no one proceeding on a mission should leave home without it.
Evan Hoffman is the Executive Director of the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiations, a leader in their field of training on and researching into the techniques of mediation and negotiation, especially but not solely for peacekeepers of all brands and stripes. They have also been active in the non-violent management of conflicts and in promoting peace around the world. It detracts not at all from Evan’s own considerable accomplishments to say that he stands on the shoulders of a giant, which for us is a very good description of his father, Ben, whose work we have reviewed elsewhere in this blog.
Evan states his thesis early and clearly: “the balance of power between the parties at the time of mediation does not need to be equal, but a balanced agreement is necessary.” And there you have in a nutshell the major challenge of any mediation process: power is usually unevenly held, which is one of the more common causes of violent conflict. This asymmetry of power, usually accompanied by unequal access to resources, makes it difficult for the lesser to come to the table, while making it (seemingly) unnecessary for the greater to come at all. Only the prospect of a balanced agreement will attract the lesser to the table, and if the process does not iron out the differences, not least of power sharing, any semblance of peace will be an illusion quickly dispelled. It is the aim of Evan’s book to provide a model for durable peace.
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Sunday, June 6, 2010
INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATIONS AND CO-OPERATION IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES:THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF CULTURES
- by Jamie Arbuckle, presented to the Workshops on Diversity and Global Understanding, Vienna 2 June 2010
Introduction
A thoroughly modern complex humanitarian emergency typically is a multi-agency operation, involving a vasty array of organizations: international, regional, local; governmental, non-governmental; civilian and military. All have a contribution to make, and some will be vital, but none of them can work alone. Meshing their capabilities to avoid duplications and omissions, is a major challenge for what, begging your pardon and for lack of any better term, I will call the international community. Collectively, they pose a staggering range of diversity, and they present the most complex operating environment I have ever encountered. It is therefore on this, the humanitarian emergency, on which I will now focus. The challenges arising from the organizational and cultural diversity of international and local actors in this type of peace operation are poorly understood, but the problems are so well-known as to have become like Dr Johnson said of the weather: more productive of conversation than of knowledge.
Thomas Weiss has described one well-known example of this complexity in the following words:
Last week (1994), I was talking to a couple of colleagues just back from Kigali. I learned that there are at least 150 international NGOS in Kigali tripping over one another, vying for turf, looking for resources. I have described this effort as like trying to herd cats. (1)
Actually, Weiss’ information was not quite accurate: others subsequently estimated at least twice that number of NGOs in Kigali in 1994 – but no one was quite sure. Five years later, in Kosovo, which is a box about 100 kilometres on a side, some estimated there were about 500 NGOs in the province – but no one was quite sure. And this was in a mission area more or less dominated by the UN, leading the “four pillars” (if you can lead a pillar) of the United Nations Secretariat, the UN High Commission for Refugees, the OSCE, the EU and, as an adjunct, the NATO-led KFOR. The landscape was crowded – especially on that moral high ground - and the architecture was ad hoc and complex.
While the UNMIK operation in Kosovo did eventually sort itself into a climate of reasonable cooperation among the various agencies and with the emerging local government, it will be no surprise that this is more usually a recipe for organizational nightmares.
In this paper, I will describe the problems of interagency communication and cooperation as I have experienced them, and as they have been related to me. Following this description of the problem I will present a short analysis of the origins of the problems, and I will provide a very brief prescription for alleviating these symptoms of disarray. Description, analysis, prescription, then: shut up, and leave time for me to hear from you.
I am constantly reminded that this is as much a learning experience for me as it is for you, and just before lunch I met one of your number who will in the course of this summer do exactly what I am recommending everyone of you should do – I'll tell you more about him as I get to the end of this presentation.
Introduction
A thoroughly modern complex humanitarian emergency typically is a multi-agency operation, involving a vasty array of organizations: international, regional, local; governmental, non-governmental; civilian and military. All have a contribution to make, and some will be vital, but none of them can work alone. Meshing their capabilities to avoid duplications and omissions, is a major challenge for what, begging your pardon and for lack of any better term, I will call the international community. Collectively, they pose a staggering range of diversity, and they present the most complex operating environment I have ever encountered. It is therefore on this, the humanitarian emergency, on which I will now focus. The challenges arising from the organizational and cultural diversity of international and local actors in this type of peace operation are poorly understood, but the problems are so well-known as to have become like Dr Johnson said of the weather: more productive of conversation than of knowledge.
Thomas Weiss has described one well-known example of this complexity in the following words:
Last week (1994), I was talking to a couple of colleagues just back from Kigali. I learned that there are at least 150 international NGOS in Kigali tripping over one another, vying for turf, looking for resources. I have described this effort as like trying to herd cats. (1)
Actually, Weiss’ information was not quite accurate: others subsequently estimated at least twice that number of NGOs in Kigali in 1994 – but no one was quite sure. Five years later, in Kosovo, which is a box about 100 kilometres on a side, some estimated there were about 500 NGOs in the province – but no one was quite sure. And this was in a mission area more or less dominated by the UN, leading the “four pillars” (if you can lead a pillar) of the United Nations Secretariat, the UN High Commission for Refugees, the OSCE, the EU and, as an adjunct, the NATO-led KFOR. The landscape was crowded – especially on that moral high ground - and the architecture was ad hoc and complex.
While the UNMIK operation in Kosovo did eventually sort itself into a climate of reasonable cooperation among the various agencies and with the emerging local government, it will be no surprise that this is more usually a recipe for organizational nightmares.
In this paper, I will describe the problems of interagency communication and cooperation as I have experienced them, and as they have been related to me. Following this description of the problem I will present a short analysis of the origins of the problems, and I will provide a very brief prescription for alleviating these symptoms of disarray. Description, analysis, prescription, then: shut up, and leave time for me to hear from you.
I am constantly reminded that this is as much a learning experience for me as it is for you, and just before lunch I met one of your number who will in the course of this summer do exactly what I am recommending everyone of you should do – I'll tell you more about him as I get to the end of this presentation.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Light Candles or Curse the Darkness: East Timor Turns the Century
“Militaries that are doing something bad sometimes go into their shell. It’s them against the world.”
- Admiral Dennis Blair, CinC U.S. Pacific Command, on the Indonesian Armed Forces, in 1999.
“ … cutting off contact with Indonesian officers only makes the problem worse”
- Paul Wolfowitz
“Better to light a candle than to curse the darkness.”
- Confucius
- a book report by Jamie Arbuckle for Peacehawks:
If You Leave us Here, We Will Die – How Genocide was Stopped in East Timor, by Geoffrey Robinson, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010, 317 pages, $35
INTRODUCTION
This book tells of the terrible and the wonderful events in East Timor, centred on but not limited to the years 1999- 2000, and of the candles that were lit then. For us the messages in this book are three, and they bear directly on our central belief that peace must be maintained at least as robustly as it is violated. These three messages concern:
1. The uses of humanitarian intervention, and the military role in such interventions;
2. The issue of consent, especially that of the Security Council, of the major powers and of the “host” government, to an intervention;
3. The relationship of peace to justice – can there be one without the other?
Geoffrey Robinson is that most valuable combination of practitioner and academic, and his book is given dramatic thrust by the fact that he was an eye-witness to much of the action of that critical year, as he was at that time a political affairs officer with the UN mission in East Timor. Reading between his lines with your accustomed skill, you will infer as did we that he and his colleagues were brave to a degree way beyond his spare descriptions of the hazards they faced. He is in “real life” a professor of history at UCLA, and he was six years with the headquarters of Amnesty International in London. He is thus well able to zoom in for the detail, and then back seamlessly out to the wider time-frame and perspective. He is a superb writer, and this book is both an invaluable reference, and a cracking good read.
- Admiral Dennis Blair, CinC U.S. Pacific Command, on the Indonesian Armed Forces, in 1999.
“ … cutting off contact with Indonesian officers only makes the problem worse”
- Paul Wolfowitz
“Better to light a candle than to curse the darkness.”
- Confucius
- a book report by Jamie Arbuckle for Peacehawks:
If You Leave us Here, We Will Die – How Genocide was Stopped in East Timor, by Geoffrey Robinson, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010, 317 pages, $35
INTRODUCTION
This book tells of the terrible and the wonderful events in East Timor, centred on but not limited to the years 1999- 2000, and of the candles that were lit then. For us the messages in this book are three, and they bear directly on our central belief that peace must be maintained at least as robustly as it is violated. These three messages concern:
1. The uses of humanitarian intervention, and the military role in such interventions;
2. The issue of consent, especially that of the Security Council, of the major powers and of the “host” government, to an intervention;
3. The relationship of peace to justice – can there be one without the other?
Geoffrey Robinson is that most valuable combination of practitioner and academic, and his book is given dramatic thrust by the fact that he was an eye-witness to much of the action of that critical year, as he was at that time a political affairs officer with the UN mission in East Timor. Reading between his lines with your accustomed skill, you will infer as did we that he and his colleagues were brave to a degree way beyond his spare descriptions of the hazards they faced. He is in “real life” a professor of history at UCLA, and he was six years with the headquarters of Amnesty International in London. He is thus well able to zoom in for the detail, and then back seamlessly out to the wider time-frame and perspective. He is a superb writer, and this book is both an invaluable reference, and a cracking good read.
Thursday, March 25, 2010
NOT BY DOVES, BUT BY HAWKS – PEACE GETS A CHANCE IN SIERRA LEONE
As the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) comes to a close at the end of this year, it may serve as a model for successful peacekeeping, as well as a prototype for the UN’s new emphasis on peacebuilding.
- From UNAMSIL: A Success Story in Peacekeeping, from “End of Mission Press Kit”, December 2005, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/Overview.pdf
A book review, by Jamie Arbuckle, for Peacehawks:
Operation Barras: the SAS Rescue Mission, Sierra Leone 2000, by William Fowler, Cassell, London, 2004. 211 pp, $9.95 (pb)
Introduction
In the summer of 2000 things just couldn’t have been much worse for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Since February, 1998, nearly 650 persons – peacekeepers, relief workers, priests, nuns, diplomats, and normal people whose luck had run out – had been kidnapped, and 19 of them had been murdered. 575 of those taken were Blue Berets, the equivalent of a whole battalion. By late summer of 2000, about 600 persons had been released, including all of the UN peacekeepers. But about 50 were still captive and, when 11 British soldiers were seized on 25 August, things were getting pretty serious. Yet, less than two years later, the civil war had ended (and seems to have stayed that way), and in 2003 the Kimberly Process virtually ended traffic in the “blood diamonds”, which had been used to finance the rebels. In 2004 the disarmament of the rebel factions was completed and a war crimes tribunal was convened. At the end of 2005, just five years after that nadir of 2000, the peacekeeping mission was being phased out to a peacebuilding mission, and the close-out briefings in New York were presenting this as the poster child of a successful mission.
What happened to make such a difference so quickly to such a dismal situation? Well, a lot of things, but the main thing was that about 600 British soldiers happened, and they made most of that difference in a matter of a few short weeks. This book, Operation Barras: the SAS Rescue Mission: Sierra Leone 2000, by William Fowler, is about what and why and how they did all that. Fowler seems well equipped and prepared for this work: he has been writing on defense policy and technology issues since 1972, and his writings have appeared in international defense magazines. He is the author of a previous book on the Commando action at Dieppe in 1942. He has been a long-serving officer with the British Reserve Army, and served in the first Gulf War.
It must be said at the outset that we found it difficult to determe just what was the author’s central thesis – why was this book written? The author tells us only that “This book is about a post-Cold War African conflict.” We thought that Operation Palliser was about much more: we thought it was a striking example of how economical and decisive military action might be, and indeed should be – but commonly is not, and the contrasts between Operation Palliser and UNAMSIL needed more consideration than they have been given – in this book and generally. Throughout this review, then, we will be drawing lessons and conclusions which the author did not – which is just why we thought this review was necessary.
- From UNAMSIL: A Success Story in Peacekeeping, from “End of Mission Press Kit”, December 2005, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/Overview.pdf
A book review, by Jamie Arbuckle, for Peacehawks:
Operation Barras: the SAS Rescue Mission, Sierra Leone 2000, by William Fowler, Cassell, London, 2004. 211 pp, $9.95 (pb)
Introduction
In the summer of 2000 things just couldn’t have been much worse for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Since February, 1998, nearly 650 persons – peacekeepers, relief workers, priests, nuns, diplomats, and normal people whose luck had run out – had been kidnapped, and 19 of them had been murdered. 575 of those taken were Blue Berets, the equivalent of a whole battalion. By late summer of 2000, about 600 persons had been released, including all of the UN peacekeepers. But about 50 were still captive and, when 11 British soldiers were seized on 25 August, things were getting pretty serious. Yet, less than two years later, the civil war had ended (and seems to have stayed that way), and in 2003 the Kimberly Process virtually ended traffic in the “blood diamonds”, which had been used to finance the rebels. In 2004 the disarmament of the rebel factions was completed and a war crimes tribunal was convened. At the end of 2005, just five years after that nadir of 2000, the peacekeeping mission was being phased out to a peacebuilding mission, and the close-out briefings in New York were presenting this as the poster child of a successful mission.
What happened to make such a difference so quickly to such a dismal situation? Well, a lot of things, but the main thing was that about 600 British soldiers happened, and they made most of that difference in a matter of a few short weeks. This book, Operation Barras: the SAS Rescue Mission: Sierra Leone 2000, by William Fowler, is about what and why and how they did all that. Fowler seems well equipped and prepared for this work: he has been writing on defense policy and technology issues since 1972, and his writings have appeared in international defense magazines. He is the author of a previous book on the Commando action at Dieppe in 1942. He has been a long-serving officer with the British Reserve Army, and served in the first Gulf War.
It must be said at the outset that we found it difficult to determe just what was the author’s central thesis – why was this book written? The author tells us only that “This book is about a post-Cold War African conflict.” We thought that Operation Palliser was about much more: we thought it was a striking example of how economical and decisive military action might be, and indeed should be – but commonly is not, and the contrasts between Operation Palliser and UNAMSIL needed more consideration than they have been given – in this book and generally. Throughout this review, then, we will be drawing lessons and conclusions which the author did not – which is just why we thought this review was necessary.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Trackless Diplomacy - At Play in the Fields of the Lord's Resistance Army
… the peacemaker must ‘wage’ peace.
- Ben Hoffmann
- by Jamie Arbuckle, for Peacehawks
Peace Guerilla – unarmed and in harm’s way, my obsession with ending violence
By Ben Hoffmann, Ph.D.
The Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation, Ottawa, 2009
206 pp., $12.96 (Cdn)
This book is the story of Ben Hoffman’s efforts to end a nineteen-year old war between Sudan and Uganda. His chief instrument in this was the Nairobi Agreement, which had been mediated by former President Jimmy Carter in December, 1999. Ben, working on behalf of the Carter Center (http://www.cartercenter.org/homepage.html), was to oversee the implementation of the Agreement. To do so, he would have to end the guerilla war being waged by Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army against the Government of Uganda, from safe areas within and with the support of Sudan. Kony’s LRA was an especially vile band, kidnapping children for “warriors” and “wives”. Kony himself, as Ben makes graphically clear, was mad, bad and dangerous to know. And get to know him Ben did, with all that entailed. If you take nothing else from this reading, you will empathize with the courage and the self-reliance required for this sort of intervention.
Ben Hoffmann is one whom we unhesitatingly call brilliant. We have worked and learned with him on occasions precious to us, and regard him as one of the best leaders we have ever followed. We had long respected his intellectual courage, and this book makes clear as well his physical courage. The story is told with cinematic sweep and a sense of excitement and adventure, and indeed Ben’s negotiations with Kony to free the kidnapped children are to be encapsulated in a movie, “Girl Soldier”, which is based on another book, Stolen Angels, by Kathy Cook (Penguin Global, 2009).
- Ben Hoffmann
- by Jamie Arbuckle, for Peacehawks
Peace Guerilla – unarmed and in harm’s way, my obsession with ending violence
By Ben Hoffmann, Ph.D.
The Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation, Ottawa, 2009
206 pp., $12.96 (Cdn)
This book is the story of Ben Hoffman’s efforts to end a nineteen-year old war between Sudan and Uganda. His chief instrument in this was the Nairobi Agreement, which had been mediated by former President Jimmy Carter in December, 1999. Ben, working on behalf of the Carter Center (http://www.cartercenter.org/homepage.html), was to oversee the implementation of the Agreement. To do so, he would have to end the guerilla war being waged by Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army against the Government of Uganda, from safe areas within and with the support of Sudan. Kony’s LRA was an especially vile band, kidnapping children for “warriors” and “wives”. Kony himself, as Ben makes graphically clear, was mad, bad and dangerous to know. And get to know him Ben did, with all that entailed. If you take nothing else from this reading, you will empathize with the courage and the self-reliance required for this sort of intervention.
Ben Hoffmann is one whom we unhesitatingly call brilliant. We have worked and learned with him on occasions precious to us, and regard him as one of the best leaders we have ever followed. We had long respected his intellectual courage, and this book makes clear as well his physical courage. The story is told with cinematic sweep and a sense of excitement and adventure, and indeed Ben’s negotiations with Kony to free the kidnapped children are to be encapsulated in a movie, “Girl Soldier”, which is based on another book, Stolen Angels, by Kathy Cook (Penguin Global, 2009).
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
The United Nations Today - As Good as it Gets?
The United Nations Today: As Good as it Gets?
- by Jamie Arbuckle, for Peacehawks
What’s Wrong With the United Nations, and How to Fix It
By Thomas Weiss,
Polity Press, 292 pp., $19.45, 2009
The UN … is essentially the collective agent of its member states. Many of the UN’s organizational incapacities could be corrected by additional resources from its member states, who devote but a tiny fraction of the resources they spend on national security to collective action under the umbrella of the United Nations.
- Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century, Ottunnu and Doyle, Rowan and Littlefield, New York, 1996
This is an interesting book about the United Nations, and an impressive effort to get beyond the usual procedural and structural tinkering which has characterized and limited most efforts to “improve” the U.N. Thomas Weiss is certainly well qualified to write this book. He combines the skills and the background of a practitioner and a scholar: he served with the U.N. Secretariat for a decade, but has also distinguished himself as an academic for over 25 years, during which he has been a profound student of and a prolific writer, researcher and teacher about, the U.N.
Sir Brian Urqhuhart, in his foreword, tells us that Weiss has come to the “bold and original conclusion” “that world government is the necessary conceptual basis for adequate future management of the major problems of our planet.” Weiss’ solution is actually much more cautious and nuanced – and realistic - than that.
Weiss makes it clear that he considers a preoccupation with sovereignty as a major problem in taking concerted action to confront global challenges: “… treating traditional sovereignty as a cornerstone for the United Nations is a fundamental structural weakness in urgent need of replacement.” He goes on: “The shortcomings of sovereignty and the ill-health of the UN system for the human rights arena can be illustrated with several examples …”. “Westphalian sovereignty impinges directly on more robust action by the United Nations in protecting the human environment.” Weiss concludes that “Westphalian sovereignty is … a chronic ailment for the United Nations, and perhaps a lethal one for the planet …”
But Weiss leaves us under no illusions that sovereignty is any less likely to be the basis for whatever international order may obtain, now or in the near future: “… the state remains essential for national, regional and global problem-solving, and nothing in this book gainsays this stark reality.” And then Weiss turns the corner, and tells us what he really means:
Yet put simply, states and their creations in the form of the current generation of intergovernmental bureaucracies cannot address the transnational problems confronting the world. As a result, and ironically, we have embraced global governance.
Weiss thus distances himself from the chimera* of global government and advocates instead global governance; governance being a more qualitative term, which Weiss defines as
… the totality of institutions, policies, rules, practices, norms, procedures, and initiatives by which states and their citizens try to bring order and predictability to their responses to such universal problems as warfare, poverty, and environmental degradation.
- by Jamie Arbuckle, for Peacehawks
What’s Wrong With the United Nations, and How to Fix It
By Thomas Weiss,
Polity Press, 292 pp., $19.45, 2009
The UN … is essentially the collective agent of its member states. Many of the UN’s organizational incapacities could be corrected by additional resources from its member states, who devote but a tiny fraction of the resources they spend on national security to collective action under the umbrella of the United Nations.
- Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century, Ottunnu and Doyle, Rowan and Littlefield, New York, 1996
This is an interesting book about the United Nations, and an impressive effort to get beyond the usual procedural and structural tinkering which has characterized and limited most efforts to “improve” the U.N. Thomas Weiss is certainly well qualified to write this book. He combines the skills and the background of a practitioner and a scholar: he served with the U.N. Secretariat for a decade, but has also distinguished himself as an academic for over 25 years, during which he has been a profound student of and a prolific writer, researcher and teacher about, the U.N.
Sir Brian Urqhuhart, in his foreword, tells us that Weiss has come to the “bold and original conclusion” “that world government is the necessary conceptual basis for adequate future management of the major problems of our planet.” Weiss’ solution is actually much more cautious and nuanced – and realistic - than that.
Weiss makes it clear that he considers a preoccupation with sovereignty as a major problem in taking concerted action to confront global challenges: “… treating traditional sovereignty as a cornerstone for the United Nations is a fundamental structural weakness in urgent need of replacement.” He goes on: “The shortcomings of sovereignty and the ill-health of the UN system for the human rights arena can be illustrated with several examples …”. “Westphalian sovereignty impinges directly on more robust action by the United Nations in protecting the human environment.” Weiss concludes that “Westphalian sovereignty is … a chronic ailment for the United Nations, and perhaps a lethal one for the planet …”
But Weiss leaves us under no illusions that sovereignty is any less likely to be the basis for whatever international order may obtain, now or in the near future: “… the state remains essential for national, regional and global problem-solving, and nothing in this book gainsays this stark reality.” And then Weiss turns the corner, and tells us what he really means:
Yet put simply, states and their creations in the form of the current generation of intergovernmental bureaucracies cannot address the transnational problems confronting the world. As a result, and ironically, we have embraced global governance.
Weiss thus distances himself from the chimera* of global government and advocates instead global governance; governance being a more qualitative term, which Weiss defines as
… the totality of institutions, policies, rules, practices, norms, procedures, and initiatives by which states and their citizens try to bring order and predictability to their responses to such universal problems as warfare, poverty, and environmental degradation.
Sunday, January 24, 2010
National Sovereignty, Domestic Jurisdiction and Consent
Presentation to the Blue Helmet Forum Austria
4-6 June 2009
National Sovereignty, Domestic Jurisdiction and Consent:
The Last Refuges of Scoundrels[1]
By James V. Arbuckle, O.M.M., C.D.
Shall I say what I mean?
Mean what I say?
- Marianne Faithful
Introduction
This paper is NOT JUST about peace operations in Chad; rather it is about ALL peace operations throughout the history of peacekeeping:
The issue of consent to an operation is central to the mandating and the conduct of all interventions. The post-Cold War surge in intra-national conflicts has increased the importance of this issue, as interventions almost inevitably encounter issues of national sovereignty. In Sudan, especially in the West Darfur region of Sudan, we see today most clearly the ongoing struggle between, on the one hand, national sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction and “host” consent and, on the other hand, a clear case of a need – some would say a responsibility – for outsiders to intervene.
4-6 June 2009
National Sovereignty, Domestic Jurisdiction and Consent:
The Last Refuges of Scoundrels[1]
By James V. Arbuckle, O.M.M., C.D.
Shall I say what I mean?
Mean what I say?
- Marianne Faithful
Introduction
This paper is NOT JUST about peace operations in Chad; rather it is about ALL peace operations throughout the history of peacekeeping:
The issue of consent to an operation is central to the mandating and the conduct of all interventions. The post-Cold War surge in intra-national conflicts has increased the importance of this issue, as interventions almost inevitably encounter issues of national sovereignty. In Sudan, especially in the West Darfur region of Sudan, we see today most clearly the ongoing struggle between, on the one hand, national sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction and “host” consent and, on the other hand, a clear case of a need – some would say a responsibility – for outsiders to intervene.
Friday, January 22, 2010
Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process
Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process
Buy or Download
Issue Areas
Conflict Management and Resolution
Mediation and Facilitation
Post-Conflict Activities
Centers
Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution
February 2009 Book by Ingrid A. Lehmann
Those who mediate international conflicts must communicate publicly with a wide variety of audiences, from governments and rebel forces to local and international media, NGOs and IGOs, divided communities and diasporas.
Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process helps mediators identify and develop the resources and strategies they need to reach these audiences. It highlights essential information tasks and functions, discusses key challenges and opportunities, and provides expert guidance on effective approaches. Examples from past mediations illustrate how various strategies have played out in practice.
The handbook sets out six steps that can be undertaken by mediators and their information teams before, during, and after peace negotiations:
• Analyze the Information Environment
• Plan Early for Information Needs
• Design a Public Information Strategy
• Implement a Communication Program
• Engage Civil Society•
Monitor, Evaluate, Assess
Following Managing a Mediation Process, this volume is the second handbook in the Peacemaker’s Toolkit series. Each handbook addresses a particular facet of the work of mediating violent conflicts, including such topics as negotiating with terrorists, constitution making, assessing and enhancing ripeness, and Track-II peacemaking.
Buy or Download
Issue Areas
Conflict Management and Resolution
Mediation and Facilitation
Post-Conflict Activities
Centers
Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution
February 2009 Book by Ingrid A. Lehmann
Those who mediate international conflicts must communicate publicly with a wide variety of audiences, from governments and rebel forces to local and international media, NGOs and IGOs, divided communities and diasporas.
Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process helps mediators identify and develop the resources and strategies they need to reach these audiences. It highlights essential information tasks and functions, discusses key challenges and opportunities, and provides expert guidance on effective approaches. Examples from past mediations illustrate how various strategies have played out in practice.
The handbook sets out six steps that can be undertaken by mediators and their information teams before, during, and after peace negotiations:
• Analyze the Information Environment
• Plan Early for Information Needs
• Design a Public Information Strategy
• Implement a Communication Program
• Engage Civil Society•
Monitor, Evaluate, Assess
Following Managing a Mediation Process, this volume is the second handbook in the Peacemaker’s Toolkit series. Each handbook addresses a particular facet of the work of mediating violent conflicts, including such topics as negotiating with terrorists, constitution making, assessing and enhancing ripeness, and Track-II peacemaking.
R2P vs State Sovereignty: The Last Refuge of Scoundrels
Presentation to Canadian Studies Centre Symposium
The University of Innsbruck
12 November 2009
R2P vs State Sovereignty: The Last Refuge of Scoundrels
- by James V. Arbuckle
Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.[1]
- Dr. Samuel Johnson, 1775
Introduction
The responsibility for the conduct of states towards their people has long been a subject of controversy. None of any outsider’s business, said Hitler in 1933 (to the League of Nations), and Stalin in 1948 (to the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the General Assembly (GA) of the United Nations on 10 December 1948, and changed forever the concept of the relationship of a state to its people, and its responsibility for them.
Despite the apparent ease of the Assembly vote on rhe UDHR (there had been abstentions, but no votes against), the subsequent approval, ratification and implementation by the member states was by no means a forgone conclusion (nor is it yet). The Soviet Union objected to what it saw as setting a precedent for outsider interference in its domestic jurisdiction. They and eight other members abstained from the General Assembly vote, and the USSR was never a signatory to the Declaration. A good many member states tacitly agreed – and do still - with the Soviet view that the UDHR was a potential threat to their sovereignty (thus coincidentally agreeing also with Hitler and Stalin); among them were the United States and China, indeed, all of the P5 agreed on that one thing, if on nothing else: their own sovereignty, and for Britain that included her empire, was their primary concern.
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was born of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which entailes a “comprehensive view of security”, giving human rights equal weight with the more traditional military and political factors of peace and security. Thus human rights, a long-standing taboo in East-West relations, became by virtue of the Final Act a legitimate subject of dialogue[2]; the peace agenda might never be the same.
In any event the appearance of a policy and associated doctrine had been established, and history unfolded into the Twenty-first Century with that altered background.
Discussion
It was in this apparently altered climate that the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released its report in December 2001 (see Annex A for summary). Now generally referred to as The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the document ostensibly became U.N. policy when it was embraced by the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, and by nearly all member states of the U.N., in September 2005. That “policy” as it was written is largely based on military action in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter[4]. However, it is today very clear that the Security Council will seldom authorize a forced intervention in a member state – the issues of consent of the “hosts” and respect for their “domestic jurisdiction” are as strong as ever.
Thinking of Haiti in the Night I am Robbed of Sleep
THINKING ABOUT HAITI IN THE NIGHT I AM ROBBED OF SLEEP[1]
By James V. Arbuckle, O.M.M., C.D.
Introduction
The Haiti earthquake is not quite the greatest catastrophe, natural or manmade, which has occurred since World War II: the death tolls in Bangladesh in 1970, China in 1976 and 2004 and on the Indian Ocean in 2004, probably exceeded the presumed deaths in Haiti this week[2]. Much has or should have been learned form these earlier tragedies about disaster relief and about reconstruction, and these early days of inevitably and excusably frantic and uncoordinated efforts must now be giving way to more effective and sustainable programmes. Detailled planning for the next stages must begin now.
We have learned in the course of that calamitous 20th Century to think of disaster response as having three phases:
Rescue;
Relief; and
Reconstruction.
The distinctions among these phases may be less apparent than conceptual; certain it is that each is heavily influenced by the others and that they must be planned with this interdependence in mind. Indeed, it will be useful if planning for all three phases begins immediately and concurrently.
Before we proceed to examine each of these clusters of issues, we need to pause to take cognizance of four Leitmotifs which will run throughout this article; these are:
Security. This is no longer a chicken-or-egg question – restoring and maintaining a positive security environment, without which all efforts may be frustrated, and will at least be severely hindered, will be a vital function of the intervention.
Interagency Cooperation. This is neither the time nor the place for the various agencies who will respond to the emergency to compete with or attempt to ignore each other. Still less may they take the time and the effort to jockey for position or a share of the limelight. This is an extremely complex situation, and it can only be approached in a spirit of collegial cooperation and effective coordination of resources and capabilities. The grim reaper has no sympathy for omissions or for duplications. And the people care very little who helps them.
Indigenous Capabilities. These can neither be ignored nor romanticized. Haiti has not had in the best of times a very effective government, nor for that matter much else in the way of functioning institutions. This is not to deny the courage and the intelligence of many Haitians, and individuals will have much to contribute. Collectively, however, Haitian society is a very different story. The most should be made of local institutions, but they must be viewed realistically.
Public Information. Much harm can be done in the very early stages of the intervention by poor passage of information, especially to the local population, and this is exacerbated by the collapse of the infrastructure. Nevertheless, disinformation, rumour and unrealistic expectations are the vermin which emerge spontaneously at the scene of a disaster and, like vermin, these must be brought under control from the very outset. The overall coordination of the information programme must be done by the highest level of authority in the country.
By James V. Arbuckle, O.M.M., C.D.
Introduction
The Haiti earthquake is not quite the greatest catastrophe, natural or manmade, which has occurred since World War II: the death tolls in Bangladesh in 1970, China in 1976 and 2004 and on the Indian Ocean in 2004, probably exceeded the presumed deaths in Haiti this week[2]. Much has or should have been learned form these earlier tragedies about disaster relief and about reconstruction, and these early days of inevitably and excusably frantic and uncoordinated efforts must now be giving way to more effective and sustainable programmes. Detailled planning for the next stages must begin now.
We have learned in the course of that calamitous 20th Century to think of disaster response as having three phases:
Rescue;
Relief; and
Reconstruction.
The distinctions among these phases may be less apparent than conceptual; certain it is that each is heavily influenced by the others and that they must be planned with this interdependence in mind. Indeed, it will be useful if planning for all three phases begins immediately and concurrently.
Before we proceed to examine each of these clusters of issues, we need to pause to take cognizance of four Leitmotifs which will run throughout this article; these are:
Security. This is no longer a chicken-or-egg question – restoring and maintaining a positive security environment, without which all efforts may be frustrated, and will at least be severely hindered, will be a vital function of the intervention.
Interagency Cooperation. This is neither the time nor the place for the various agencies who will respond to the emergency to compete with or attempt to ignore each other. Still less may they take the time and the effort to jockey for position or a share of the limelight. This is an extremely complex situation, and it can only be approached in a spirit of collegial cooperation and effective coordination of resources and capabilities. The grim reaper has no sympathy for omissions or for duplications. And the people care very little who helps them.
Indigenous Capabilities. These can neither be ignored nor romanticized. Haiti has not had in the best of times a very effective government, nor for that matter much else in the way of functioning institutions. This is not to deny the courage and the intelligence of many Haitians, and individuals will have much to contribute. Collectively, however, Haitian society is a very different story. The most should be made of local institutions, but they must be viewed realistically.
Public Information. Much harm can be done in the very early stages of the intervention by poor passage of information, especially to the local population, and this is exacerbated by the collapse of the infrastructure. Nevertheless, disinformation, rumour and unrealistic expectations are the vermin which emerge spontaneously at the scene of a disaster and, like vermin, these must be brought under control from the very outset. The overall coordination of the information programme must be done by the highest level of authority in the country.
Introduction to Peacehawks
Peacehawks is a mom-and-pop academic ngo, founded by Ingrid Lehmann, Ph. D. and Jamie Arbuckle, O.M.M., C.D. Peacehawks is based on the principle that international peace can and must be enforced, just as are national and local laws. The international community has the firm obligation to protect the rights of peoples as defined by customary international law, taking "all necessary measures" to ensure the safety and security of nations and peoples, and "to maintain international peace and security."
It is clear that, in the long term, interventions will require the consent of the "hosts", however "all necessary measures" must be taken to include the creation of a climate of consent, whether by carrot or stick; consent may and sometimes must be induced. There is thus a requirement for muscular peacekeeping, and many occasions when nothing less will do. When peace descends, it is to be treated with respect, hence our logo (for which many thanks to Jason), which shows a hawk with an olive branch, and our motto:
About Ingrid
About Jamie
Jamie Arbuckle is a Canadian but, like a lot of Canadians, he wasn’t born there. He was born in Dayton, Ohio, the result of an earlier Dayton Agreement. At 18 he immigrated to Canada and joined the Black Watch, as a private. Three years later, having become a Canadian citizen, he was commissioned a 2Lt in The Royal Canadian Regiment. He retired from the Canadian Army in 1995. In his 36 years in the Army, he served in airborne, mechanized and light infantry units. He served 12 years with Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany, including two postings with the Bundeswehr. As a peacekeeper, he served three tours with the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and with UNPROFOR in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia in 1992.
Jamie was a member of the Faculty of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Nova Scotia from 1995 – 1999. From 1999 to 2003, he was a member of the Capacity Building and Training Section of the OSCE in Vienna. He was in that period principally responsible for assisting in the design and delivery of the New Member Induction Programme for the OSCE. He also delivered seminars on Conflict Management for the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna and for missions in Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Albania, as well as at the Austrian Peace Support Command, the German Foreign Ministry Training Centre in Bonn and at York University in the UK.
Jamie has written several articles on military issues for professional publications, and a book entitled The Level Killing Fields of Yugoslavia: An Observer Returns, published by the Pearson Press in 1999. He was the English copy editor for the Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations, published by Kluwer Law International in 2002. His book on the military role in humanitarian operations, entitled Military Forces in Twenty-first Century Peace Operations: No Job for a Soldier?, was published by Routledge /Taylor and Francis in 2006.
Jamie lives in the Salzkammergut in Austria.
It is clear that, in the long term, interventions will require the consent of the "hosts", however "all necessary measures" must be taken to include the creation of a climate of consent, whether by carrot or stick; consent may and sometimes must be induced. There is thus a requirement for muscular peacekeeping, and many occasions when nothing less will do. When peace descends, it is to be treated with respect, hence our logo (for which many thanks to Jason), which shows a hawk with an olive branch, and our motto:
Whatever it Takes!
About Ingrid
Ingrid A. Lehmann is the author of Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire (London: Cass, 1999) and many articles on issues of international political communication. She is a practitioner who worked in the United Nations Secretariat for over twenty-five years, including service in the Department of Public Information and in two UN peacekeeping missions. Ingrid has an MA in history from the University of Minnesota and an MA and a doctorate in political science from the University of Berlin. In 1993–94 she was a fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University; in 1996–97 she was a researcher at Yale University’s UN Studies Program; and in 2004 she was a fellow at Harvard University’s Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy. Ingrid now lives near Salzburg, Austria, where she has been teaching in the Department of Communication Science of the University of Salzburg.
About Jamie
Jamie Arbuckle is a Canadian but, like a lot of Canadians, he wasn’t born there. He was born in Dayton, Ohio, the result of an earlier Dayton Agreement. At 18 he immigrated to Canada and joined the Black Watch, as a private. Three years later, having become a Canadian citizen, he was commissioned a 2Lt in The Royal Canadian Regiment. He retired from the Canadian Army in 1995. In his 36 years in the Army, he served in airborne, mechanized and light infantry units. He served 12 years with Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany, including two postings with the Bundeswehr. As a peacekeeper, he served three tours with the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and with UNPROFOR in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia in 1992.
Jamie was a member of the Faculty of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Nova Scotia from 1995 – 1999. From 1999 to 2003, he was a member of the Capacity Building and Training Section of the OSCE in Vienna. He was in that period principally responsible for assisting in the design and delivery of the New Member Induction Programme for the OSCE. He also delivered seminars on Conflict Management for the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna and for missions in Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Albania, as well as at the Austrian Peace Support Command, the German Foreign Ministry Training Centre in Bonn and at York University in the UK.
Jamie has written several articles on military issues for professional publications, and a book entitled The Level Killing Fields of Yugoslavia: An Observer Returns, published by the Pearson Press in 1999. He was the English copy editor for the Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations, published by Kluwer Law International in 2002. His book on the military role in humanitarian operations, entitled Military Forces in Twenty-first Century Peace Operations: No Job for a Soldier?, was published by Routledge /Taylor and Francis in 2006.
Jamie lives in the Salzkammergut in Austria.
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